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Abstract
This paper provides a simple model of corruption dynamics with the ratchet effect.
Corrupt officials have ex post the incentive to price discriminate entrepreneurs based
on the entry decisions made in an earlier period. The inability of government officials
to commit to future money demands induces entrepreneurs to delay entry in order to
receive a discount in the permit price later.  Even though the dynamic setting leaves
the corrupt official with less extortion power, social welfare may decrease.  We also
explore the effect of the official’s tenure stability on the extent of corruption. This
allows us to identify circumstances under which the often observed practice of job
rotation can help mitigate corruption.
JEL Classification: D9, H2, K4, L1.
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This paper is concerned with the dynamics of corruption.  We analyze a dynamic version of Shleifer and
Vishny’s [1993] model of corruption where  the sale of government property (entry permit) by
government officials is considered as the prototype of corruption activities.
1   In our two-period model of
corruption, entrepreneurs are required to purchase a license from a corrupt official to open a shop.  Our
dynamic model departs from Shleifer and Vishny in that the official may require the renewal of the license
at a fee in the second period.
2 Moreover, the corrupt official is allowed to induce more entry in the
second period. In such a setting, corrupt officials have ex post  the  incentive to price discriminate
entrepreneurs based on the entry decisions made in the earlier period. We show that the inability of
government officials to commit to future demands entails the ratchet effect in that entrepreneurs have
the incentive to delay entry into the market in order to receive a discount in the permit price later.
3
The ex post opportunism erodes the official’s monopoly power and reduces his overall revenues
from selling permits.  The effect of ex post opportunism on the aggregate social welfare, however, is
ambiguous.   In the second period, the official typically induces more entry compared to the commitment
solution by giving a discount to new entrants.  Thus, the second period welfare is higher when the official
is unable to commit to future demands.  The discount, however, provides incentives to delay entry for
potential entrepreneurs, resulting in less entry in the first period compared to the commitment solution.
As a result, the first period welfare is lower without commitment power.  The overall effect on the
aggregate social welfare thus depends on the relative magnitude of these two countervailing effects.
We also explore the effect of the official’s tenure stability on the extent of corruption.  The
question here is whether the often observed practice of job rotation can help mitigate corruption.  If a
corrupt official is replaced, this will not only affect his own initial strategy, but the outcome will also
                                                                
1 The fundamental analysis of this type of corruption activities dates back to Rose-Ackerman’s (1978) seminal work.
For the motivation of studying the dynamics of corruption, see Choi and Thum (1998), who provide many cases of
corruption that fit the model.
2  The repeated demands in corruption are well-documented.  See, for instance, John T.  Noonan’s (1984)
comprehensive study on bribe.
3 The seminal papers on the ratchet effect are by Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985) and  Laffont and Tirole (1988).
The ratchet effect has been applied to several dynamic problems in public economics, e.g., income taxation (Dillen and
Lundholm, 1996) and the public provision of private goods (Thum and Thum, forthcoming).2
depend on the new official’s information structure. Whether job rotation is beneficial from a welfare
point of view finally depends on whether the new (corrupt) official can distinguish in his extortion
activities between established firms and new entrants.
Elsewhere in Choi and Thum (1998), we adopt the same type of two-period model to study
corruption dynamics.  However, our earlier paper is different from the current one in two important
aspects.  Firstly, these two papers employ different assumptions about the information structure the
government official has in the second period about individual entrepreneurs. The earlier paper assumes
that the entrepreneurs are anonymous in that the existing firms can disguise themselves as new entrants if
any discounts are offered to new entrants, whereas the current paper considers the case of identified
entrepreneurs.  Thus, the official in Choi and Thum (1998) cannot price discriminate against the first
period entrants in the second period. This implies that there is no ratchet effect; there are no incentives
for the entrepreneurs to delay their entry to disguise as low types in order to elicit the discount later.
Secondly, Choi and Thum (1998) analyse a different type of ex post opportunism facing the
government official.  More specifically, there are sunk investments associated with the initial entry.  We
ask whether the government officials’ ex post opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs have
made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations. We initially show that the inability
of government officials to commit to future demands does not distort entry decisions any further if the
choice of technology is not a decision variable for the entrepreneurs.  The government official can
properly discount the initial demand in order to induce the appropriate amount of entry.  If, however, the
choice of technology is left to the entrepreneurs, the dynamic path of demand schedules will induce
entrepreneurs to adopt an inefficient ”fly-by-night” strategy.  They will choose a technology with
inefficiently low sunk cost components, which allows them to react more flexibly to future demands from
corrupt officials.  We  characterise the equilibrium  behaviour of the government officials and the
entrepreneurs’ technology choices.  In particular, we show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Once entry decisions are made by entrepreneurs, the government officials’ optimal strategy is to demand3
varying amounts of money.  This provides a new interpretation of the arbitrariness that entrepreneurs
often face in a corrupt environment;
4 uncertainty is simply an equilibrium property of repeated extortion.
Both of our papers build on the works by Shleifer and Vishny [1993] and Bliss and Di Tella
[1997].   Shleifer and Vishny’s main concern is to investigate how the harmful effects of corruption
depend on “the industrial organization of corruption.”  They argue that when corruption activities are
decentralised, the harmful effects of corruption are accentuated.  As different agencies set their bribery
demands independently in order to  maximise their own revenue, they do not take the negative
externalities on other agencies’ revenues into account. Bliss and  Di  Tella [1997] investigate the
relationship between market competition and corruption.  They recognise that the extent of competition
is not an exogenous parameter since corruption itself can affect the number of firms in a free-entry
equilibrium through the endogenously determined level of graft.  In a model where the level of corruption
and the extent of entry are co-determined by what they call “deep competition” parameters, they show
that there is no simple relationship between competition and corruption, thus questioning the validity of a
commonly held belief that competitive pressures in the market can mitigate corruption.  Our papers are
concerned with dynamic aspects of corruption. We extend the analysis to a dynamic situation where the
official who has previously collected the bribe comes back to demand more to explore implications of
the official’s ex post opportunism.
The remainder of the paper is organised in the following way.  In Section 2, we set up the basic
model of corruption dynamics with the ratchet effect.  We characterise the time-consistent demand
schedule for the official and equilibrium entry dynamics for the entrepreneurs.   The effect of the ratchet
effect on the intertemporal aggregate welfare is also analysed.  In Section 3, we extend the basic model
to explore the effect of the official’s tenure stability on the extent of corruption.  Section 4 contains
concluding remarks.
                                                                
4 See, e.g., Klitgaard (1990) for various accounts of this type of uncertainty for investors.4
2. The Basic Model of Corruption Dynamics
We develop a two-period model of corruption dynamics.  Consider a government official who has the
power to issue licenses that allow entrepreneurs to open a shop.
5  The official sets the price of the
license to maximise revenues from licensing.
Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their ability to generate (net) income in each period, denoted
by v.  Let us normalise the total population of entrepreneurs to unity.   The distribution of abilities is given
by the inverse cumulative distribution function F(v) with continuous density F´ £ 0, that is, F(v) denotes
the proportion of entrepreneurs who can generate income more than v in each period.  The type of
entrepreneurs is private information to entrepreneurs.  The government official knows only the
distribution of types. However, once entry decisions have been made by entrepreneurs, the official can
update his information on the types of entrepreneurs.  In the second period, this updated information
allows the official to price discriminate in his demands between those who have entered and those who
have not in the first period.  We explore the implications of this price discrimination for the entry
dynamics of entrepreneurs.  
2.1 The Static Problem
We first analyse a static problem as a benchmark.  This preliminary analysis also helps us to develop
notation. Let us assume that there are no operating costs for firms.
6  Then, if the official demands m for
the license, the marginal type who is indifferent between entry and exit is given by  m v = .  Thus, the
official solves:
) ( max m F m
m ￿ (1)
                                                                
5 As pointed out by Stigler (1971), “[t]he state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with even
the mightiest of its citizens: the power to coerce.”  The state’s monopoly on coercion can lead to the abuse of power
when public officials have wide discretion and little accountability due to the lack of formal checks and balances
[World Bank (1997)]. Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) show that efficient government regulation and corruption which is
caused by the regulatory intervention coexist in equilibrium.
6 This assumption is made without any loss of generality since we can interpret v as the income generated net of any
operating cost.5
This one-to-one relationship between the monetary demand and the marginal type allows us to use the
marginal type  v as the control variable for the government official, which turns out to be more
convenient for later analysis:
) ( max v F v
v ￿ (1’)
The first order condition for the marginal entrant  v, which in turn determines the number of
entrants ) (v F , is given by:
0 ) (   ' ) ( = ￿ + v F v v F (2)
We make the standard assumption that the distribution of types satisfies the monotone hazard rate
condition, that is, -F´/F is increasing:
0 ) ' ( "
2 > + - F F F (3)
This assumption ensures that the official’s objective function is quasi-concave and the second order
condition for the maximisation problem is satisfied:
0 ) ( " ) ( '   2 < ￿ + ￿ v F v v F .
7 (4)
Let v* as implicitly defined by (2) be the solution to the above problem, i.e.,
) ( * v F v   argmax v ￿ = . (5)
Then, the marginal entrepreneur is  * v  and the number of entrants is given by  *) (v F .  The official
demands  * * v m =  for the license.
2.2 The Dynamic Problem with Commitment
We now consider a dynamic (two-period) problem where the official can come back to demand more in
the second period.  The timing is as follows.  At the beginning of the first period, the official demands m1
                                                                
7 Using the first order condition, we can rewrite the second order condition as  0 ) (   ' / ) ( ) ( " ) (   ' 2 < ￿ - ￿ v F v F v F v F .
The second order condition holds if the distribution F satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition.   This condition
is a standard assumption in the incentive literature and is satisfied by most widely used distributions; see Fudenberg
and Tirole [1991, p. 267].6
as a licensee fee for opening a business.  Potential entrepreneurs know their own type (v) and decide
whether or not to enter. In the second period, the official can demand more money when the license has
to be renewed. We assume that the entrepreneurs who entered in the first period are identified; the
existing firms cannot disguise themselves as new entrants if any discounts are offered to new entrants.
8
This informational assumption implies that the official can charge different prices for the right to operate
in the second period between existing (old) firms (
o m2) and new entrants (
n m2).  The firms who entered
in the first period decide whether to stay in the business by paying 
o m2 or exit from the market.  Those
firms that did not enter in the first period can potentially enter the market in the second period by paying
n m2 (see Figure 1).    
The official cannot commit to 
o m2 and 
n m2 before entry occurs in the first period. The official ex
post has the incentive to exploit those who entered in the first period since they have revealed that they
are high type entrepreneurs.  This updated information in the second period allows the official to price
discriminate against the first-period entrants, charging them a higher price while setting a lower price for
new entrants.  In this setting, we ask how the official’s ex post opportunism to utilise his new information
for price discrimination influences the entry behavior of entrepreneurs.
                                                                
8 The assumption of identified entrepreneurs is appropriate when corruption involves large corporations and/or face-
to-face personal contacts.  For example, consider the investment history of Gulf Oil Corporation in South Korea.  In
1966, when Gulf had invested $200 million in South Korea, the incumbent party asked for a $1 million contribution to
finance its election campaign.  As John T. Noonan [1984, 638] notes, “[t]he request was accompanied by pressure
which left little to the imagination.” When another election was held four years later, S.K. Kim, a leader of the
incumbent party, asked again for a ‘campaign contribution’ of $10 million.  For smaller enterprises, it is usually not
difficult to disguise themselves as new entrants; towards the corrupt official, they can simply install a front man and
claim that the enterprise is a new entry.  Such a disguise may be more difficult for large corporations as in the example
of Gulf’s FDI in Korea.  For an analysis of corruption dynamics under the informational assumption of the anonymous
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Figure 1. The Timing of the Repeated Extortion Game
Before answering the question above, however, we first consider the counterfactual case where
the official can commit to his future demand in the first period before the entry decisions are made.  We
establish that the optimum in the commitment case is essentially the replication of the static solution with
the same number of firms in both periods.
Given m1 and (
o m2 ,
n m2), the entry/exit behaviour in the second period can be characterised by
the following cut-off rule.  First period entrants will continue to stay in the market if and only if v ‡
o m2.
Potential new entrants will enter if and only if v ‡







n m2), for the first period entrants and new entrants respectively.
9  These two numbers
characterise the entry/exit configuration in the second period.  If any, the number of new entrants is given
by  ) - 1 2 ( ) ( v F v F
n
 and the number of exiting firms is given by  ) ( ( 2 1
o
v F v F - ) .
In the first period, entrepreneurs with type v will enter if the following two conditions are
satisfied:
(v - m1) + d max[v - 
o m2, 0] ‡ 0 (IR) and (6)
(v - m1) + d max[v - 
o m2, 0] ‡ d (v - 
n m2) (IC) (7)
where d ( 1 £ d ) is the discount factor.  The first condition (IR) is the individual rationality condition.  The
second one (IC) is the incentive compatibility condition which states that entry in the first period is more
profitable than delayed entry in the second period.  It can be easily verified that if these two conditions
are satisfied for type v, then they are also satisfied for any type  v v > ' .  Thus, we can define a critical
                                                                
9 The bar indicates that a variable refers to the commitment scenario.8
type  1 v  for the first period entrants.  Note that 
o v2 ‡ 1 v  and 
n
v 2£ 1 v  by definition.  We will say that there
is exit in the second period if 
o
v 2> 1 v  and there is new entry in the second period if 
n
v 2< 1 v .




v 2= 1 v .  Moreover,
the number of entrants with commitment is the same as the one in the static model ( 1 v  = v*).  Thus, the
commitment solution replicates the static solution.
Proof. It can be easily verified that the IR constraint above is not binding.
10  As a result, we can ignore
the IR constraint.  The marginal type in the first period ( 1 v ) is that for which the IC constraint is binding







n m2, we have the following relationship:
) (
2 1 1 1
n
v  -  v v m d - = .   (8)
Thus, the government official’s revenue as a function of the marginal types in each period can be written
as
[ ] { } ) - + ￿ d   +   ) ( ￿ 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ( 2 2 2 2 2 2 v F v F m v F m v F  = m v v v R
n n o o n o C
[ ] [ ] { } ) - + ￿ d ￿ d - 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
2 2 2 2 2 v F v F v v F v  +  v F v  -  v v   =
n n o o n
(9)
) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
2 2 2 2 1 1
n n o o
v F v v F v  +  v F v = d d d + ￿ ￿ - .




v 2= * v [see Eq. (5)].  This implies that there is neither exit nor
entry in the second period and the commitment solution replicates the static solution in terms of the
extent of entry.
2.3 The Dynamic Problem without Commitment
Now let us analyse the case where the official cannot commit to the future level of demand before the
entry decision is made.  As in the case of commitment, the first period entry decision is characterised by
a cut-off rule.  Let us denote v1 as the marginal type entrant in the first period when no commitment is
possible. The official in the second period faces two sets of entrepreneurs; those who entered in the first
                                                                
10 Since 
n m2(=
n v2 ) £  1 v , the IR constraint is automatically satisfied if the IC constraint is satisfied.9
period with v˛ [v1, ¥] and those who have not entered with v˛[0, v1].   As a result, the marginal type
v1 will serve as the state variable in the second period.
The optimal second period demands (
o m2,
n m2) can be determined by the marginal types
(
o v2 ,
n v2 ).  Once again, we will find it more convenient to treat (
o v2 ,
n v2 ) as the control variables.  Since
the official is assumed to be able to distinguish the existing entrepreneurs from potential new entrants, he
solves two separate problems.
For potential new entrants, the maximisation problem for the official can be written as:
n n n n
n v v F v F m v F v F
v
Max 2 1 2 2 1 2
2
)] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [ ￿ - = ￿ - . (10)
The demand for entry permit from the new entrants is represented by the “truncated demand function”
[F(v) – F(v1)].  Let F(v1) maximise [F(v) – F(v1)] v.  That is, F(v1) satisfies the following first order
condition:
0 )] ( )) ( ( [ ) ( )) ( ( ' 1 1 1 1 = - F + F ￿ F v F v F v v F . (11)
Note that our assumption about the monotone hazard rate condition also implies that the “generalized
hazard rate”  )] ( (.) /[ (.) ' 1 v F F F - -  is increasing for all v1, ensuring that the second order condition for
the  maximisation problem is satisfied and  F(v1) is well  defined.
11    Given  v1, the optimal entry
configuration for new entrants in the second period is thus:
n v2 = F(v1). (12)
The indirect revenue function for the official from new entrants is given by
n
2 p ( v1) =[F(F(v1)) – F(v1)] F(v1). (13)
For future reference, we observe that the total differentiation of (11) yields:
                                                                
11 Let  )] ( ) ( /[ ) ( ' ) ( 1 v F v F v F v H - - ” .  Then,  )] ( ) ( " } )) ( ' ( ) ( ) ( " [{ sign )] ( ' [ sign 1
2 v F v F v F v F v F v H ￿ + + ￿ - = .
From the monotone hazard rate condition [see (3)], we know that  0 } )) ( ' ( ) ( ) ( " {
2 > + ￿ - v F v F v F .  There are two
cases to consider.  If  0 ) ( " > v F , obviously  0 ) ( ' > v H .  If  0 ) ( " < v F ,  ) ( ) ( " } )) ( ' ( ) ( ) ( " { 1
2 v F v F v F v F v F ￿ + + ￿ -
= 
2 )) (   ' ( )]
1
( ) ( [ ) ( " v F v F v F v F + - ￿ -  >  0 )) (   ' ( ) ( ) ( "
2 > + ￿ - v F v F v F .  Once again,  0 ) ( ' > v H .10







1 n n n
n





¢ + ¢ ¢
= = F > 0.
12 (14)
Since F(¥) = 0, we have F(¥) = v* [see Eq. (11)].  Thus, for any number of entrants in the first period,
the marginal new entrant in the second period has a lower revenue than the marginal entrant in the case
with commitment: F(v1) < v* for any v1 .  This implies that the total number of firms in the second period
is larger than in the commitment scenario.
For the existing entrepreneurs, the official’s maximisation problem is:   
o o o o v v F m v F
v
Max 2 2 2 2 0
2
) ( ) ( ￿ = ￿    subject to 
o v2 ‡ 1 v . (15)
Thus, the optimal entry configuration for the existing entrepreneurs is:
o v2 = max [v1, v*].







* if * *) (




1 2 v v v v F
v v v v F
v
o (16)
Proposition 2. In equilibrium without commitment, there is no exit in the second period, that is,
* 1 v v >  and thus  1 2 v v
o = .
Proof.  The official’s overall revenue in present value can be written as:
) ( 1 v R
NC  = F(v1) m1 + d[
o
2 p ( v1) + 
n
2 p ( v1)]. (17)
Suppose  * 1 v v £ .  Then, the official’s second-period optimal demand for the existing entrepreneurs is
given by 
o m2 (=
o v2 = v*) ‡  v1.  This implies that the marginal type v1 does not get any surplus in the
second period.  Since the marginal type is indifferent between entering in the first period and delaying
entry until the second period, we have the following relationship:
v1 - m1  = d[ v1 - F(v1)]. (18)
Substituting (13), (16) and (18) into (17) yields:
                                                                
12 To sign the expression, recall that the second order condition in (4) requires the denominator to be negative.11
{ }
). ( )) ( (     *   *) (         ) (   )   - (1
) (   )] (   - )) ( ( [     *   *) F(     )]} (   -     [   -   { ) ( ) (
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
v v F v v F v v F
v v F v F v v v v v v F v R
NC
F ￿ F ￿ d + ￿ ￿ d + ￿ ￿ d =
= F ￿ F + ￿ ￿ d + F ￿ d ￿ =
  (19)
When v1 £ v*,  ) ( 1 v R
NC  is strictly increasing in v1 since  v v F ￿ ) (  is quasiconcave with the optimum at v*
and F(v1) < v* [=F(¥)] with F¢(v1) > 0.  Thus, any demand schedule that induces v1£ v* cannot be
optimal for the official. n
The analysis above indicates that when the government official cannot commit to the second
period demands, there is less entry in the first period and more entry in the second period in comparison
to the commitment case (or the static case): v1 > v* and v2 < v*.  The reason for the low level of entry in
the first period is the ratchet effect [Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985)].  By entering in the first
period, entrepreneurs reveal their ability to generate high incomes and consequently are subject to
adverse “price discrimination” in the second period.  Entrepreneurs thus deliberately delay their entry to
take advantage of the lower license price offered to new entrants in the future.
As is standard in the time consistency literature the ex post flexibility, i.e. the official’s ability to
adjust his demands based on newly available information, actually hurts him in terms of revenues he can
collect [see, for instance, Tirole (1988)]; the official’s dynamic monopoly power is undermined by his
own ability to price discriminate based on entry history.  This result has implications for the official’s
choice of information structure.  Suppose that the official has some control over the information structure
through his decision concerning whether or not to monitor individual entrepreneurs.  Import licenses and
taxi licenses, for instance, can be made anonymous by granting entrepreneurs the right to resell them in
the secondary market.  Thus, a corrupt official may deliberately choose a way of extortion that does not
allow himself to keep track of extorted entrepreneurs over time.  Our result suggests that the
“anonymous” information structure analysed in Choi and Thum (1998) may arise endogenously.
The loss of monopoly power, however, does not automatically translate into welfare gains in
comparison to the commitment case.  Compared to the commitment case, there is less entry in the first
period (v1 > v*).  The first period welfare thus is lower in the no commitment case.  However, there are
more entrants in the second period ( v2 < v*); hence, second period welfare is higher in the no
commitment case.  The overall impacts of  ex post flexibility on the intertemporal aggregate welfare12
depends on the relative magnitude of these two countervailing effects.  To demonstrate the ambiguity of
the welfare consequences, we consider two cases, linear and kinked demand for entry. For simplicity,
we assume that d=1.
13
Example 1. The Linear Demand Case
Suppose that the entrepreneur types are distributed uniformly on the unit interval  [ ] 1 , 0 ˛ v , that is,
v v F - =1 ) ( .  In this case, we can easily verify that F(v1) = v1/2 and 
n
2 p (v1) = (v1/2)
2.  The government
official without commitment induces v1 =3/5 and v2 =3/10. The sum of welfare over the two periods is
given by:
W =W1 + W2 =  dx x ￿
1
5











In contrast, when the government official can commit to future demand, the marginal entrant is the same
across periods with v1 = v2 = 1/2.   The welfare with commitment power is given by:
W = 1 W + 2 W = 2 dx x ￿
1
2
1 = ¾ (< W).
Thus, with a uniform distribution, social welfare increases as the government official loses dynamic
monopoly power.
Example 2. The Kinked Demand Case
To demonstrate that the welfare effect of commitment is ambiguous, we simply introduce a kink in the
demand for entry.




£ £ - ￿
< £ -
=
. 1 2 / 1 for ) 1 ( 2 / 3





                                                                
13  The examples can easily be generalised for all  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ d .
14 This example is borrowed from Malueg and Solow (1989), who discuss the welfare implications of selling versus
renting by a durable-goods monopolist.13
The example is illustrated in Figure 2.  As it is more convenient to use the number of entrants as a
choice variable in this example, the number of entrepreneurs who can generate income of at least v in
each period is denoted on the horizontal axis.  Let n1 = F(v1) be the number of entrants in the first
period.  Then, given n1, the government official’s problem in the second period can be written as:
[ ]




> ￿ + - ￿ ￿ -
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where n2  is the total number of entrants in the second period and  ) ( 1 1 n v  is the marginal first-period
entrant’s willingness to pay [ 1 1 1 3
2 1 ) ( n n v ￿ - =  for 
4
3
1 £ n  and  ) 1 ( 2 ) ( 1 1 1 n n v - ￿ =  for
4
3
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Figure 2. Linear and Kinked Demand for Entry
That is, with the kinked demand curve chosen here the government official induces second-period entry













1 2 n n
n
n m
Now we can turn to the first period. With d=1, Eq. (8) can be written as  2 2 1 m v m
n = = . The
marginal entrant in the first period has to be indifferent whether to enter immediately or wait until the
second period. If the bribery payments for new entrants are the same in both periods, the marginal
entrant makes a profit of  1 1 m v -  in the first period and has to pay the entire second period revenue as a
bribe. If he waits until the second period, he would just make the same profit of  2 1 m v - . The official’s
overall revenue can now be written as:




> ￿ - ￿ - + ￿ ￿ - + ￿
£ - ￿ + ￿ + ￿
=
½. for ½ ½ ) 1 ( 1 ) - (1
½ for ) ¾ ( ½ ½
) (
1 1 1 1 1 1 1






n n n n n n n
n n n n
n R
NC
The first-order condition yields:
½ 1 = n  and, therefore,  ¾ 2 = n .
In our simple example, it is not even necessary to calculate explicitly the welfare levels with and without
commitment power of the corrupt official. Without commitment, the government allows half of the firms
to enter in the first period and another quarter of the firms in the second period. With commitment, it is
easy to see that it is optimal to have three quarters of the firms in for both periods. Hence, the number of
firms is the same in the second period for both scenarios but is lower in the first period without
commitment (½ instead of ¾). Thus, with the kinked demand function, social welfare decreases when
the corrupt government official loses commitment power.
Proposition 3. Compared to the commitment case, there is less entry in the first period but more entry
in the second period. The impact of ex post flexibility (i.e. lack of commitment power) on total welfare is
ambiguous.15
3. Job Rotation and the Dynamics of Corruption
One practice often observed in various organisations is job rotation.
15  This practice can be puzzling,
since transferring individuals to new jobs sacrifices job-specific human capital (Ickes and Samuelson,
1987).  One prominent explanation is that job transfers prevent corruption by ensuring that employees
do not occupy a job long enough to reap the benefits of corrupt activities.
16  This is why Transparency
International (undated) lists job rotation in its “Best Practice Documentation”.  The documentation, for
instance, explicitly commends the new German federal guidelines for the prevention of corruption
(Federal Ministry of the Interior, 1998) which require job rotation for corruption-prone positions.  In this
section, we investigate the implications of job rotation for the dynamics of corruption in our model.
Let us parameterise the frequency of job rotation by b, which is the probability that the official
will remain in the same position in the second period.  For the purpose of maximizing license revenue, b
plays the role of a discount factor for the official.  If there is a job transfer, the office is assumed to be
occupied by another corrupt official.
17 For simplicity, we ignore discounting by setting d=1. We consider
two scenarios depending on the information structure assumed for the new official. In the first scenario,
the new official can distinguish between old and new firms, whereas he cannot in the second scenario.
3.1. First Period Entrants Identified by the New Official
This case analyses a situation where the new official enjoys the same information as the old official.  It
corresponds to a situation where the identities of entrants are publicly available.   In this case, the change
of power is irrelevant for the entrepreneurs while it affects directly the original corrupt official, who is
transferred elsewhere.  With this information structure, the second period demands will be independent
of who is in power.  Once again, it can be shown that the optimal strategy in the second period is to
                                                                
15 Job rotation, for instance, is observed in planned enterprises in the former Soviet Union, the U.S. foreign service
and military.
16 Other explanations for job transfers include mitigating the ratchet effect, sorting employees into the jobs where they
will be the most productive and allowing potential future managers to gain familiarity with various aspects of an
organisation’s operations.  See Ickes and Samuelson (1987) for details.
17 The case of job rotation with true reforms (and anonymous firms) where corrupt officials are replaced by honest
ones is discussed in Choi and Thum (1998).16
extract the whole surplus of the marginal type who entered in the first period without inducing any exit.
18
Thus, the marginal type in the first period is given by  ) ( 1 1 1 1 v v m v F - = -  with d=1.  Hence, we have
1 m = F(v1).
The maximisation problem for the official in the first period is then:
) ( 1 v R
NC  = F(v1) m1 + b[
o
2 p (v1) + 
n
2 p (v1)] (20)
= F(v1) F(v1)   + b[
o





2 p ( v1) = F(v1) v1 and 
n
2 p ( v1) = [F(F(v1)) – F(v1)] F(v1).
The first order condition is given by:
[ ] 0 ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( ) ( ) ( ' 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 = p + p ￿ b + F ￿ + F ￿ v v v v F v v F
n o . (21)
Totally differentiating Eq. (21) with respect to v1 and b yields:
[ ] + 1 s.o.c dv 0 ] ) ( ' ) ( ' [ 1 2 1 2 = b p + p d v v
n o , (22)
where [s.o.c] denotes the second order condition for (20) and is negative.  Thus, the sign of  b d dv / 1 is
the same as the sign of  ] ) ( ' ) ( ' [ 1 2 1 2 v v
n o p + p , which in general is ambiguous.    The reason is that
0 ) ( ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 1 1 1 2 < + ￿ = p v F v v F v
o  for v1 > v*, whereas  0 ) ( ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 1 1 2 > F ￿ - = p v v F v
n  by the envelope
theorem.  If  0 ) ( ) ( ' )] ( ) ( ' [ ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 > F ￿ - + ￿ = p + p v v F v F v v F v v
n o  and thus  0 / 1 > b d dv , an
increase in the frequency of job rotation (a lower b) induces more entrants in the first period.  This in
turn implies more entrants in the second period since there is a monotonic relationship between the
number of entrants in the first period and in the second period ( 0 ) ( ' 1 > F v ).  Such a condition, for
instance, is satisfied for uniform distributions.  If we assume that v is distributed uniformly on [0,1], it can
be verified that v1= ) 3 2 /( ) 2 1 ( b + b + , which is increasing in  b. In such a case, the practice of job
rotation can be justified as an instrument of reducing the harmful effects of corruption.  If any job-specific
human capital is involved, the optimal job design in an organisation requires that the probability of job
rotation b be chosen to trade off the benefit of thwarting corruption against the loss of human capital.
                                                                
18 The reason is that the official in the first period never finds it optimal to induce entry level such that v1 £v*.17
3.2. First Period Entrants Not Identified by the New Official
This case analyses a situation where the new official has no information concerning the identities of
entrants in the first period.  It corresponds to a situation where the identities of entrants are not publicly
available and thus price discrimination based on entry history is not possible for the new official.  In this
case, the change of power is also relevant for the entrepreneurs.   When the new official comes in, he
will solve the static optimisation problem and will charge v*.  Thus, the marginal type in the first period is
given by:
v1 -  1 m + (1- b) (v1- v*) = b[v1 - F(v1)] + (1- b) (v1- v*).
The relationship between the first period monetary demand  1 m and the marginal type  1 v  is  1 m  = (1- b)
v1+ b F(v1).  The maximisation problem for the official in the first period is then:
) ( 1 v R
NC  = F(v1) m1 + b[
o
2 p (v1) + 
n
2 p (v1)] =
= F(v1) [(1- b) v1+ b F(v1)] + b[F(v1) v1 + 
n
2 p (v1)] = (23)





2 p ( v1) = [F(F(v1)) – F(v1)] F(v1). The first order condition is given by:
F¢(v1) v1 + F(v1) + b [F¢(v1) F(v1) + F(v1) F¢(v1) + 
n
2 p ¢(v1)] = 0. (24)
Totally differentiating Eq. (21) with respect to v1 and b yields:
[ ] + 1 s.o.c dv [F¢(v1) F(v1) + F(v1) F¢(v1) + 
n
2 p ¢(v1)] db = 0, (25)
where  [s.o.c] denotes the second order condition for (23) and is negative.  Since
) ( ) ( ' ) ( 1 1 1 2 v v F v
n F ￿ - = p ¢(v1) by the envelope theorem, we have  0 / 1 > b d dv .    In this case, an
increase in the frequency of job rotation (a lower b) unambiguously induces more entrants in the first
period.  In the event of job rotation, however, the new official lacks the information to price discriminate
in the second period.  As a result, he will solve the static maximisation problem and will induce F(v*)
entrants in the second period independent of entry configuration in the first period.  In the second period,
the number of entrants with a new official is less than the number of entrants in the event that the old
official retains his job, F(F(v1)), for any  v1.  The overall effect of job rotation on welfare is thus18
ambiguous.  If the new official cannot identify who entered in the first period, the practice of job rotation,
in a sense, mimics the outcome under commitment in that there is no price discrimination in the second
period.
This implies that the combined welfare of the officials will increase with the practice of job
rotation in this case.  This result is consistent with our earlier observation that the official prefers the
“anonymous” information structure in that job rotation can be considered as a commitment not to keep
track of the identities of entrants in the first period.  Thus, the corrupt officials may have collective
incentives to implement the practice of job rotation.  We can also conclude that if the intertemporal
aggregate welfare is higher under the commitment regime, job rotation will be beneficial.  In contrast, if
the intertemporal aggregate welfare is higher under the no commitment regime, job rotation can be
harmful.
In light of our earlier welfare result in Section 2, we can conclude that job rotation is harmful in
the uniform distribution case if the new official lacks the information concerning the identities of the first
period entrants.  Thus, we have a completely opposite result compared to the case where the new
official can identify the first period entrants; there, job rotation was beneficial.  These results suggest that
the welfare consequences of job rotation in the dynamics of corruption hinge crucially on the information
structure facing the new official.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analysed the dynamics of corruption when the official can identify which entrepreneurs
have entered in the first period and can discriminate on the basis of entry history in the second period.
We demonstrated that the entry dynamics are characterized by the ratchet effect in that entrepreneurs
deliberately delay their entry to take advantage of a lower license price offered for new entrants in the
future.  We also analysed the effects of the ratchet effect on the  intertemporal aggregate welfare.
Compared to the commitment case, there is less entry in the first period but more entry in the second
period. Thus , the total impact of the ratchet effect on welfare is ambiguous. In addition, we explored the19
effect of the official’s tenure stability on the extent of corruption. Whether the often observed practice of
job rotation can mitigate corruption crucially depends on the information available to new officials. If a
new official can identify first period entrants, job rotation must lead to more entry in the first period with
welfare being enhanced. Alternatively, with the new official  not being able to identify first period
entrants, job rotation is beneficial if the commitment solution – i.e. more entry in the first period and less
entry in the second period – is superior to the outcome with the ratchet effect.
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